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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
WILL J. McGOWAN, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a Corporation, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 
7683 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Basing his complaint upon the Safety Appliance Act 
(45 U. S. C. A., Section 2 et seq.) respondent brought this 
action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to 
have been sustained as a result of the use by the appellant 
in interstate commerce of a car "not equipped with coupler 
mechanism which would couple automatically on impact" 
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(R. 1-4). The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plain-
tiff in the amount of $13,000.00 (R. 25-A). The court grant-
ed a new trial conditioned upon the plaintiff's refusal to 
remit $6000.00 from the judgment. He accepted the reduced 
amount and a new trial was denied (R. 28). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, a brakeman, was injured while the crew of 
which he was a member was switching cars. in the defend-
ant's railroad yard at Cameo, Colorado (R. 35). The move-
ment in the course of which the plaintiff was injured in-
volved the coupling of a Grand Trunk Western Railroad 
car and a Rio Grande car, No. 70523 (R. 36). The Grand 
Trunk Western car was a boxcar and was stationary. The 
Rio Grande car was a coal car and was attached directly to 
the engine (R. 36). Plaintiff was directing the coupling 
movement from a position on the ground about eight feet 
away from the end of the boxcar (R. 38-9). As the coal 
car reached a point opposite him he inserted his foot between 
the cars and against the dra wbar of the coal car ( R. 40). 
When the coupling devices of the two cars came in contact 
plaintiff's foot was. between them, and he suffered the loss 
of part of the big toe of his right foot (R. 41-5). The cars 
coupled upon impact notwithstanding the presence of por-
tions of plaintiff's foot was inside the knuckles. (R. 41). 
Plaintiff testified that the coal car was. moving at a 
speed of about four miles an hour when it reached a point 
about eight feet from the boxcar and that he then noticed 
that the drawbar appeared to be "out of line" (R. 40). He 
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says he pushed on the drawbar three times but he was un-
able to determine the extent of movement of the drawbar, 
if any, accomplished by his pushing on it with his foot (R. 
65-6). He was, however, still pushing on the drawbar when 
the cars came together ( R. 68) . 
The cars were about eight feet apart when the plain-
tiff made the first push on the drawbar with his foot (R. 
64). 
He testified that while the coal car was moving this 
distance at a rate of speed of about four miles an hour, 
he not only pushed on the drawbar three times with his 
foot but found time to step out from between the cars in 
the interval between the first and second push and signal 
the engineer to stop (R. 67). He says that this signal was 
given when the cars were about four feet apart and that the 
engineer ignored the signal (R. 67). 
The engineer testified for the defendant that he ob-
served the plaintiff standing near the point where the 
coupling was later made and that when the two cars were 
about one foot apart the plaintiff went between the cars 
(R. 95-7). He recognized the plaintiff's danger and im-
mediately attempted to stop the train but was unable to do 
so (R. 95-7). He observed the plaintiff during the entire 
course of the movement and testified positively that at no 
time did the plaintiff give any stop signal (R. 97). 
The coal car was barely moving at the time of impact 
and the coupling was made with only a minimum of jarring. 
Mr. Kuykendall, the conductor, remained at the scene 
of the accident until the arrival of three safety inspectors, 
employees of the defendant (R. 101). These inspectors care-
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fully examined the coupling devices of both cars and made 
several tests in which the cars on every occasion coupled 
automatically upon impact. McCoy, one of the inspectors, 
testified that there was no defect of any kind in any of the 
coupling mechanism of either car and that they functioned 
perfectly. 
Mr. McCoy als.o te·stified that the coal car drawbar 
against which plaintiff had pushed was of modern type, 
built on a rocker mechanism so that it would automatically 
rock or gravitate to a centered position (R. 107). This 
rocker is called a swinging type carrier arm, and its purpose 
is to keep the drawbar centered within a minimum l·ateral 
play of not more than one inch each way (R. 107). The 
lateral movement could be increased to two inches each 
way by exerting extra pressure, so that the carrier arm 
would "ride up." This extra pressure was demonstrated by 
two men pushing against the drawbar. One man could not 
push the drawbar beyond the one inch free play allowed by 
the rocker. As soon as the e·xtra pressure was released the 
drawbar would rock back within the centered area (R. 108). 
The witness also testified that the rocker mechanism 
was in good mechanical condition, and that there were no 
defects which would prevent it from rocking back within the 
one inch play permitted by the special type rocker arm (R. 
108, 109, 112, 113 and 115). 
The defendant had prepared for the jury a portable 
mechanism upon which were· mounted two drawbars and 
couplers of the exact type, measurement, and make of the 
couplers involved in the accident. These couplers were so 
constructed that they could be operated and pushed to-
gether in the presence of the jury (Ex. 5) . 
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The witness Martin, who is the General Car Fore·man 
of the Grand Junction Division, testified that he supe·rvised 
the construction of the exhibit and that it was in all re-
spects identical to the equipment involved (Ro 115-120). 
After qualifying as an expert witness he explained to the 
jury why the drawbars must be engineered so that they can 
move laterally 0 This movement is necessary so that the 
cars can negotiate curves and accommodate the swaying 
motion incident to ordinary travel along the tracks (Ro 121). 
If at least a two-inch movement each way is not allowed, a 
car as long as the coal car (fifty feet and two inches.) will 
derail on curves. For this reason the coal car was equipped 
with a drawbar which would, under extra pressure, move 
two inches each way, and when the pressure was released, 
gravitate back to a centered position (R. 121-122) o 
Mr 0 Martin further testified that he had never seen 
any railroad car on the D 0 & R. G. system, or on the system 
of any other railroad, that had a mechanism on the side of 
the car from which an operator could center a drawbar, 
and that on occasions men go between the cars. for the pur-
pose of making a preliminary alignment of a drawbaro He 
stated, however, that this preliminary action takes place 
when the cars are stopped (R. 124-125-126). 
The only injury sustained by the plaintiff was the 
crushing of the big toe, necessitating amputation at the 
first joint (R. 45) 0 He was off work from April 16th to the 
latter part of September. He resumed his regular employ-
ment as a brakeman in September and was so employed at 
the time of the trial (R. 47). 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT A FINDING THAT THE COUPLERS DID 
NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE 
STATUTE. 
II. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS SET 
FORTH IN INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 3 AND 4. 
III. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS SET 
FORTH IN INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 5 AND 7. 
IV. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN EXCLUDING THE PROFFERED EVI-
DENCE OF THE DEFENDANT THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF VIOLATED THE SAFETY AND 
OPERATION RULES OF THE COMPANY AND 
THAT ON THE DAY BEFORE PLAINTIFF'S 
INJURY, PLAINTIFF HAD VIOLATED SAID 
RULES AND HAD BEEN SPECIFICALLY 
WARNED TO DESIST FROM SUCH PRACTICE. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT A FINDING THAT THE COUPLERS DID 
NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE 
STATUTE. 
The controlling provision of the Safety Appliance Act 
reads as follows: 
"It shall be unlawful for any common carrier 
engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to haul 
or permit to be hauled or used on its line any car 
used in moving interstate traffic not equipped with 
couplers coupling automatically on impact and which 
can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going 
between the ends of the cars." 
We do not contend that the trial court erred in refusing 
to grant the defendant's motion for a directed verdict be-
cause of the absence of any evidence of a mechanical defect 
in the coupling devices or because of a failure of proof of 
negligence on the part of the defendant in maintaining the 
couplers in a state of good repair. What we do contend is 
that there is no evidence which tends to prove that the cars 
in question were not equipped with couplers that would 
couple automatically on impact or that there was any in-
sufficiency in the coupling equipment that made it neces-
sary for the plaintiff to go between the cars to effect the 
coupling on the occasion in which he was injured. 
To effect a coupling of two railroad cars by any de-
vices so far invented, it is necessary that the drawbars 
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of the couplers be in alignment sufficient to allow the 
jaws or knuckles of the couplers to mesh. The coupled 
cars cannot be operated in any ordinary railroad movement 
if the drawbars are rigidly fastened to the cars. There 
must be some lateral play in the drawbars or the cars will 
derail upon reaching a curve in the railroad tracks. The 
amount of lateral play required to prevent derailment of 
the car depends upon the size and length of the car. No 
court, so far as we know, has ever intimated that a draw-
bar having only a reasonably required lateral play does 
not meet the full requirements of the statute. 
There is no evidence whatsoever to the effect that the 
drawbar on either of the cars involved in the coupling 
movement had any more lateral play than was necessary to 
successfully operate the cars. 
As to the amount of lateral play in the drawbar of 
the standing box car the only testimony was that this type 
of car had a maximum lateral play of 2lj2 inches. However, 
the plaintiff testified that he observed the drawbar on 
this car and that it was in a centered position. This testi-
mony was not disputed. The plaintiff in his complaint 
makes no claim that the drawbar on this car was out of 
alignment. In any event the coupling was made without 
anything being done to this drawbar in the way of align-
ing. 
With respect to the lateral play in the drawbar of the 
moving coal car, the undisputed testimony was that in 
order to operate the car on the defendant's tracks, the 
drawbar had to have a lateral play of two inches on each 
side. The evidence is further undisputed that this drawbar 
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had a lateral play of only two inches on each side. Mr. 
Martin measured the lateral play and testified without 
contradiction that it was not in excess of the amount re-
quired to keep the car from derailing. 
The evidence being uncontradicted that neither draw-
bar had any more lateral play than required to operate 
the cars successfully and that the drawbar on the standing 
car :was in a centered position, there remains for consider-
ation the position of the draw bar on the moving coal car. 
Assuming solely for purpose of argument that a draw-
bar having a maximum lateral play of two inches on each 
side may, on some occasion, require alignment in order to 
effect a coupling and that the statute requires that such 
a car be equipped with a mechanism that will align the 
drawbar without the necessity of a man going between the 
cars to operate the mechanism, there is in this case no evi-
dence of any failure on the part of the defendant to comply 
with the statute as so interpreted. 
The only claim made by the plaintiff of any defect or 
insufficiency in the coupling mechanism of the two cars 
was that the Rio Grande car's drawbar was out of align-
ment and had no device whereby it could be aligned except 
by pushing on the drawbar with the hands or feet. There-
fore the precise question to be determined is whether there 
is any evidence to sustain any such claimed defect or in-
sufficiency. 
It is undisputed that the drawbar on this car was 
equipped with a rocker or swinging carrier arm device. 
This rocker device was designed to automatically rock or 
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gravitate the drawbar to a centered position. It was made 
to perform that function without the necessity of any 
manual operation or manipulation. By the exertion of a 
great deal of pressure it was possible to push the drawbar 
off center a maximum of two inches each way. The mo-
ment this lateral pressure was released, the drawbar would 
be swung back by the rocker to a centered position. It is 
possible that the drawbar could have a lateral play of as 
much as one inch after the pressure was released but there 
is nothing to indicate that a drawbar having only that much 
lateral play would move off center sufficient to prevent 
the knuckles from meshing upon impact. 
There is no evidence that the rocker device failed to 
perform the function for which it was designed. 
We are aware that plaintiff testified that he observed 
that the drawbar on the moving car was "out of line". How-
ever, he made this observation while the car was moving 
about four miles per hour and when the front of the draw-
bar had reached a point eight feet from the point of coupl-
ing. He says that he pushed on the drawbar with his foot 
three times. He was unable to state how much, if any, he 
succeeded in moving the drawbar. It is extremely signifi-
cant that he was still pushing on the drawbar at the very 
moment the coupling occurred. 
We submit that this testimony is wholly insufficient to 
prove any defect or insufficiency in the rocker device or 
that it failed in any respect in its function of automatically 
aligning the drawbar to a position where the cars would 
couple upon impact. The plaintiff's testimony that the draw-
bar was out of line to the extent that the two cars would 
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not couple upon impact was a mere opinion, which the 
subsequent event demonstrated was in error. He could not 
say to what extent, if any, his pushing on the drawbar 
caused it to move one way or another. His testimony is en-
tirely speculation. He speculated that the drawbar was out 
of alignment at the very instant that the coupling occurred 
because he was then still pushing it with his foot. He was 
most certainly wrong at that instant. He was also wrong 
the first time he pushed. 
In the case of Kansas City M. & 0. R. R. Co. v. Wood, 
262 S. W. 520, the very same kind of evidence was offered 
to show that a drawbar was out of alignment and was 
rejected as mere speculation in view of the fact that the 
cars actually coupled just as they did in the case at bar. 
The appellate court of Texas said: 
"There is no proof other than this of any de-
fects whatever in the couplers in question, mechan-
ically or otherwise, and nothing to support plaintiff's 
contention save his own observations and opinion 
as to what would have happened had he not gone 
between the cars. This, we think, is leaving the 
domain of fact and invading the realm of fancy, and 
is too meager to sustain a recovery against appel-
lant. The burden was upon the plaintiff to show 
some defect that would constitute a failure to com-
ply with the Federal 8afety Appliance Act. The 
fact that Wood went between the cars and was hurt 
imposes no burden upon appellant unless it was 
negligent or failed to comply with law. And, as said 
in Ry. Co. v. Bonds (Tex. Giv. App.), 244 S. W. 
1102: 
" 'It would be manifestly unfair to hold 
that the carrier had violated the statute until 
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the inefficiency of the device had been disclosed 
by some reasonable test that would justify the 
conclusion that it was defective.' 
"See also, Morris v. Ry. Co. (Tex. Civ. App;), 
158 s. w. 105·5." 
The decision of the Texas appellate court is unanswer-
able. The statute which we are considering requires the 
railroad to provide a certain type of equipment. The equip-
ment specified is that which will accomplish a designated 
function and which can be manipulated without a man going 
between the cars. It would be manifestly unwarranted, to 
hold that a finding of insufficiency in the coupling equip-
ment could be based upon a mere guess of an injured em-
ployee. 
It is submitted that a failure to comply with Section 
2 of the Safety Appliance Act can be established only by 
proof of some mechanical defect or by failure of the coupl-
ing mechanism to function upon a fair test. Such proof 
is certainly required in an action based upon the provisions 
of the Safety Appliance Act requiring the carrier to equip 
its cars with an efficient hand brake. To this effect see 
King v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co·., ... Utah 
... , 211 P. (2d) 833, from which we quote as follows: 
"In the recent case of Myers v. Reading Co., 331 
U. S. 477, 67 S. Ct. 1334, 91 L. Ed. 1615, the U. S. 
Supreme Court announced the rule as to the meth-
ods of showing that a hand brake is 'inefficient' 
within the meaning of the Safety Appliance Act. 
The court quoted with approval from Didinger v. 
Pennsylvania R. Co., 6 Cir., 39 F. 2d 798, 799, as 
follows: 
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" 'There are two recognized methods of 
showing the inefficiency of hand brake equip-
ment. Evidence may be adduced to establish 
some particular defect, or the same inefficiency 
may be established by showing a failure to 
function, when operated with due care, in the 
normal, natural, and usual manner.'" 
No logical reason can be assigned for refusing to adopt 
the same method for determining whether the carrier has 
complied with the section specifying the type of couplers 
which must be furnished. 
There was, as has been pointed out, no evidence what-
ever of any mechanical defect in the coupling device on 
either car. There was likewise no evidence whatever of any 
failure of the couplers to function when subjected to a fair 
test. On the contrary they functioned perfectly on the 
occasion in question and thereafter when repeatedly tested. 
The plaintiff's testimony that he thought the drawbar was 
out of line has no probative value whatever. The controlling 
inquiry is whether the equipment was sufficient or insuf-
ficient-not what the plaintiff thought about it. Nothing 
short of a fair test could establish its insufficiency. Such 
a test was given and conclusively demonstrated the suf-
ficiency of the entire coupling mechanism. 
It is extremely difficult to read the plaintiff's version 
of how the accident occurred and escape the conviction 
that the plaintiff was between the cars attempting to adjust 
the knuckles and not to align the drawbar. Of course he 
testified that the knuckles were open but that is contrary 
to the admitted fact that his foot was inside the knuckle 
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and that he was pushing against the knuckle at the instant 
of impact. His description of hopping along on one foot 
to align the drawbar is fantastic. His statement that he 
signalled the engineer to stop was flatly contradicted. His 
story that he was aligning the drawbar is demonstrated by 
the facts and circumstances of the accident to be a fiction. 
In any event, there was no evidence that the rocker mech-
anism had failed to align the drawbar sufficiently to effect 
a coupling upon impact, and the court erred in denying the 
defendant's motion for a directed verdict. 
II. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS SET 
FORTH IN INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 3 AND 4. 
Instruction No. 3 re·ads. in part as follows: 
"If you find from a preponderance of the evi-
dence that on the occasion when plaintiff was in-
jured the couplers on the two cars would not have 
coupled automatically upon impact without the 
necessity of plaintiff going between the cars, then 
the defendant is guilty of a violation of the Safety 
Appliance Act, and if such violation proximately 
caused, in whole or in part, injuries to plaintiff, 
then you should return a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff and against the defendant and award to 
plaintiff damages as in these instructions set forth." 
The fundamental vice in this instruction is that it 
makes the liability of the defendant turn upon a theoretical 
function and the conduct of the plaintiff. 
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The statute, however, deals solely with mechanical 
equipment. The reference in the statute to function and to 
human conduct is merely descriptive of the type of equip-
ment required and the place where the equipment is to be 
attached to the cars. It is error to assert that this statute 
requires coupling devices that will operate without manipu-
lation by human hands. The limit of the requirement of the 
statute is that those parts of the coupling equipment that 
require manpower to operate shall be so attached to the 
cars so as to permit operation from a position outside the 
cars. It is true, of course, that the statute requires the 
mechanism to perform a certain function but it does not 
require that the equipment shall perform this. function with-
out the intervention of any human manipulation. No coup-
ling device has been invented which will function auto-
matically unles.s the knuckles are properly set. Yet it is 
universally held that the carrier meets the requirement of 
the statute when the cars are equipped with levers attached 
to the outside of the car by means of which the employee 
can open the knuckles. The most recent announcement of 
this proposition was made by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in A! folder v. New York, Chicago and St. 
Louis R. R. Co., 339 U. S. 96, 94 L. Ed. 683, 70 S. Ct. 509. 
We quote: "Of course this assumes that the coupler 
was placed in a position to operate on impact. Thus if the 
failure of these two cars to couple on impact was because 
the coupler on the Pennsylvania car had not been properly 
opened the railroad had a good defense" and from the dis-
senting opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson, "The court of ap-
peals thought the charge as a whole very probably gave the 
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jury the impression that it need only find that two cars 
failed to couple on impact to establish a violation of the 
Safety Appliance Act. This as the court recognizes is not 
the law. Before a failure to couple establishes a defective 
coupler it must be found that it was properly set so it could 
couple. If it was not adjusted, as such automatic couplers 
must be, of course the failure is not that of the device." 
Also see: 
Western & Atlantic· R. R. v. Gentle, 198 S. E. 
257, 58 Ga. App. 282. Certiorari denied 
59 S. Ct. 252, 305 U. S. 654, 83 L. Ed. 424. 
Soutkern Ry. Co. v. Stewart, 119 Fed. (2d) 
85. Reversed on other grounds 62 S. Ct. 
616, 315 u. s. 283. 
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Charlton, 247 Fed. 
34, 159 C. C. A. 252. 
The error pointed out in Instruction No. 3 was em-
phasized in that portion of Instruction No. 4 which reads: 
"You are further instructed that it was the duty of the de-
fendant company to require on the two cars in question 
couplers that would couple automatically upon impact with-
out the necessity of plaintiff going between the cars." Al-
though this instruction does faintly recognize that the sta-
tute deals with machinery and not conduct (a virtue which 
Instruction 3 does not posess) still it requires the carrier to 
furnish a type of equipment which has not yet and never 
will be invented. 
It requires the carrier to equip its cars with a mechan-
ism that will function without any manual effort being 
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applied to it. Such a device is unknown. Surely the statute 
was not intended to require a carrier to perform an im-
possibility. The requirement of the statute that the equip-
ment shall perform a certain function does not mean that it 
must function without any intervention of manpower. Such 
however is the type of equipment that Instruction No. 4 
required the defendant to furnish. The instruction there-
fore repeated and emphasized the vice contained in Instruc-
tion No.3. 
These two instructions deal directly with the statute 
upon which liability is solely predicated. Since they em-
body a radical misconception and erroneous interpretation 
of the statute, the errors were seriously prejudicial and pre-
vented the defendant from having a fair trial. 
III. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS SET 
FORTH IN INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 5 AND 7. 
Instruction No. 5 reads: 
"You are instructed that the phrase 'without the 
necessity of going between the cars' means that in 
order to effect an automatic coupling it was neces-
sary ~or a workman to place some part of his body 
within the area between the cars. 
"In this connection you are instructed that if, 
in order to effect an automatic coupling by impact, 
it was necessary for plaintiff to adjust the draw-
bar or coupling mechanism with his hands or feet, 
then there would be a violation of the Safety Ap-
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pliance Act by the defendant in not having the type 
of coupler required by the Act. 
"You are further instructed that it would make 
no difference whether the car was moving or stand-
ing still." 
The definition in the first paragraph above of the 
phrase "without the necesHity of going between the cars" is 
confusing, misleading to the jury and entirely erroneous. To 
begin with, there is no such phrase in the Safety Appliance 
Act. The similar phrase of the statute is "without the neces-
sity of men going between the ends of the cars." It is obvious 
from a mere cursory reading of the statute that the phrase 
"without the necessity of men going between the ends of the 
cars" is no more than a description of the design of the coup-
ling equipment to be placed on the cars. It is a specification 
for the location of certain parts of the coupling mechanism. 
It is a direction that the parts of the coupling mechanism that 
are to be manipulated by manpower are to be located on the 
outside of the car. If any authority were needed to demon-
strate that such is the intent and meaning of this phrase, it 
can be found in the Affolder case cited above. 
The second paragraph of Instruction No. 5 applies this 
misconception of the statute and repeats and emphasizes the 
error in Instructions. Nos.. 3 and 5. It makes the liability of 
the defendant turn upon the lack of necessity of the plaintiff 
to do certain things. The statute, however, makes the liabil-
ity of the defendant depend upon the type and condition of 
the coupling mechanism on its cars. 
The instruction was actually a peremptory direction to 
return a verdiot for the pl·aintiff because admittedly it was 
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necessary for the plaintiff to adjust the knuckles with his 
hands if they were closed. The knuckles are, of course, a 
part of the coupling mechanism. To tell the jury that it 
would be a violation of the Safety Appliance Act if it was 
necessary in order to effect an automatic coupling by impact 
for the plaintiff to adjust the coupling mechanism with his 
hands left the jury no alternative except to return a verdict 
for the plaintiff. It is impossible for a carrier to equip its 
cars with a self-operating mechanism that will open 
knuckles, and the statute does not require such a mechan-
ism. It is satisfied by a mechanism attached to the outside 
of the car, notwithstanding the mechanism can be operated 
only by manpower. Since the instruction involved a com-
pletely erroneous interpretation of the statute and directed 
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, there is no occasion to 
consider further the prejudicial character of the error. 
The last paragraph of the instruction is sui generis. 
We are utterly unable to see wherein the paragraph has, any 
bearing upon the Safety Appliance Act or any of the issues 
in this case. The only possible function it could serve would 
be to perplex and confuse the jury. An equally enlightening 
and helpful instruction would be to tell the jury that it 
makes no difference whether the car was black or white. 
We need not determine whether the last paragraph of 
the instruction is so meaningless as to render the error in 
it harmless because the error in the remaining part of the 
instruction is so patent and fundamental that no reason-
able mind could, in our opinion, regard it as harmless. 
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In Instruction No.7 the court instructed the jury that: 
"The Safety Appliance Act applicable to this 
case requires. that a common carrier shall equip cars 
used by it in interstate commerce with couplers which 
will couple automatically by impact without the 
necessity of men going between the cars and the fact 
that some lateral motion in the coupler mechanism 
is necessary in the operation of defendant's trains 
does not relieve the defendant from the requirements 
of said Act." 
We submit that this instruction is a further repetition 
of errors in other instructions. considered above and is 
peculiarly misleading and confusing. It misconstrues the 
intent and meaning of the statute and then proceeds to direct 
the jury to give ,consideration to a wholly irrelevant and 
immaterial matter. It tells them that the fact that there 
must be some lateral motion in the coupling mechanism does 
not relieve the defendant from the requirements of the Act. 
The inevitable effect of s.o instructing the jury is to create 
in their minds a conviction that a mechanism having some 
lateral play does not meet the requirements of the statute. 
Of course the necessity of lateral play in the drawbar 
does not relieve the carrier from its duty of complying with 
the Act. Neither does the necessity of having knuckles 
that open and close relieve the carrier of such duty. Nothing 
relieves the carrier of its. duty because the duty is absolute. 
It would therefore have been entirely proper for the court 
to have instructed the jury as requested by the defendant 
that the exis.tence of the normal amount of lateral play was 
not evidence of a violation of the Act. But to tell the jury 
that the necessity of lateral motion in the coupler does not 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
relieve the defendant from the requirements of the Act 
is equivalent to telling them that lateral play is evidence of a 
violation. The instruction is utterly indefensible and highly 
prejudicial to the defendant's case. 
See: 
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Corp. v. Arrington, 101 
S. E. 415 (Va.). 
IV. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN EXCLUDING THE PROFFERED 
EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANT THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF VIOLATED THE SAFETY AND 
OPERATION RULES OF THE COMPANY AND 
THAT ON THE DAY BEFORE PLAINTIFF'S 
INJURY, PLAINTIFF HAD VIOLATED SAID 
RULES AND HAD BEEN SPECIFICALLY 
WARNED TO DESIST FROM SUCH PRACTICE. 
The court, during the trial and in the presence· of the 
jury, refused to let defendant cross-examine the plaintiff 
on his alleged violations of the safety and: operating rules 
of the defendant company. During the noon recess on the 
day of the trial, this matter was argued informally to the 
court and the court sustained the plaintiff's objections to 
such proffered testimony. Thereafter, the defendant was 
permitted to m·ake its proffer of the evidence excluded, 
which proffer was made on the cross-examination of the 
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plaintiff and in the absence of the jury. During this cross-
examination the plaintiff admitted that the safety rules of 
the operative department of The Denver and Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Company, and particularly Rule 101, Rule 
102 and Rule 107, were violated by him at the time of his 
injury and that he knew that said rules were in effect at the 
time of the violation. These rules are set out in defendant's 
proposed Exhibit 2. The rule specifically prohibits an em-
ployee from going between moving cars or from using hands 
or feet to adjust drawbars, knuckles or lockpins while the 
cars are in motion (R. 76, 77 and 78). 
The plaintiff also admitted that he was familiar with 
the operating rules and regulations of the railroad, par-
ticularly Rule 811 of defendant's proposed Exhibit 3. This 
rule likewise prohibits employees from going between cars 
in motion or in attempting to couple cars while they are in 
motion ( R. 79). Also, during the course of the cross-examin-
ation which was conducted in the absence of the jury, the 
defendant denied that on April 14, 1950, the day before the 
accident in which he was. injured, he had violated the fore-
going rules by pushing on a drawbar with his. foot while the 
cars were in motion and that on that occasion the conductor 
of the crew had warned him against this practice. 
The conductor of the crew was called to testify relative 
to this incident. His testimony likewise was taken in the 
absence of a jury. He said that on the 14th day of April, the 
day before plaintiff's injuries, while he and the plaintiff 
were engaged in switching operations in the yard at Fun-
ston, Colorado, that the plaintiff kicked on a drawbar with 
his foot while the car was in motion and that he was warned 
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of the bad practice and advised against it. In response· to 
the warning, Mr. McGowan merely "looked at him and 
grinned" (R. 84, 85). All of the foregoing evidence was 
excluded and was never presented to the jury. Certainly, if 
such evidence was competent and material, the court's rui-
ng excluding it was prejudicial. 
The defendant contends that the rejected evidence was 
material to show that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence 
which was the sole proximate cause of the injury complained 
of. 
We may assume, for the moment, that the plaintiff 
proved as matter of law a violation of Section 2 of the 
Safety Appliance Act. There would still remain for de-
termination by the jury the question whether such viola-
tion contributed to the injury or whether the injury was 
caused solely by the negligence of the plaintiff. That the 
assumed violation of Act did not as a matter of law contrib-
ute to the injury is established by two recent decisions of 
this Court and the authorities therein cited. 
See: 
Coray v. Southern Pac. Co., . . . Utah ... , ~23 
P. (2d) 819; 
Wilson v. Union Pac. R. Co., ... Utah ... , 231 
P. (2d) 715. 
In the Coray case, the violation of the Safety Appliance 
Act was conclusively established, and in the Wilson case 
it was assumed in considering whether the violation con-
tributed to the injury as a matter of law. Here the most 
that the plaintiff can claim is that it was for the jury to 
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determine whether the defendant violated the Act. It fol-
lows that since it was for the jury to determine whether 
there was a violation of the Act and whether such violation 
if it existed contributed to the injury, there was open to 
the defendant the defense that negligence of the plaintiff 
was the sole cause of the injury. In this posture of the 
case any evidence tending to show that plaintiff was guilty 
of negligence which was the sole cause of the injury was 
admissible. 
It is true that the defendant was permitted to show 
that plaintiff went between the cars while one of them was 
in motion. We concede that the jury could properly have 
determined from the evidence admitted by the court that 
plaintiff was negligent and that his negligence was the sole 
cause of the injury. But the rejected evidence would have 
demonstrated the plaintiff's negligence as a matter of law. 
It would have established that the defendant had expressly 
directed the plaintiff not to go between moving cars for 
any purpose, that the plaintiff had notice of this instruc-
tion and of the danger attending its violation; that, not-
withstanding this express direction and warning, the plain-
tiff deliberately disobeyed the instructions and exposed 
himself to danger which he fully understood and appreci-
ated. 
The rejected rules contain a specific direction to all 
employees, including the plaintiff, not to go between mov-
ing cars for any purpose. The rejected testimony would 
have shown that the plaintiff knew and understood the 
contents and the meaning of this rule. The rejected testi-
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mony of the conductor would have established a direct 
warning to the plaintiff of the danger of going between 
moving cars. In other words, it would have established 
the plaintiff's negligence as a matter of law. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has. consist-
ently held that the violation by a railroad employee of a 
specific order or rule of conduct of which he has knowledge 
and understands constitutes negligence on his part which 
precludes recovery for an injury proximately caused by 
such violation. 
See: 
Southern Ry. Ca. v. Youngblood, 286 U. S. 313, 
52 S. Ct. 518; 
Southern Ry. Co. v. Dantzler, 286 U. S. 3·18, 52 
S. Ct. 5·20; 
Great Northern R. R. Co. v. Wilds, 240 U. S. 
444, 36 S. Ct. 406; 
Frese v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 263 U. S. 1, 44 
S. Ct. 1; 
Unadilla Valley R. R. Co. v. Caldine, 278 U. S. 
139, 49 S. Ct. 91. 
See also: 
Vandeveer v. Delaware L. & W. R. Co., 84 F. 
(2d) 979. 
This question before us was considered in Boghich v. 
Louisville & N. R. Company, 26 Fed. (2d) 361. In that 
case the engineer on defendant's train had been killed when 
his engine ran into a passenger train at a crossing. The 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
operating rules of the Company provided that trains should 
come to a full stop before going on to a crossing such as 
the one involved in the accident. The deceased's widow 
brought the case under the Boiler Inspection Act, alleging 
failure of the defendant railroad to have a proper headlight 
on the train which her husband was operating. The evi-
dence conclusively showed that this headlight was defective. 
Under the Boiler Inspection Act contributory negligence 
is not a defense. The trial court permitted the railroad 
to introduce evidence, over the plaintiff's objection, of the 
failure of the deceased to stop his train before going on 
to the crossing, which failure was a violation of the oper-
ating rules of the Company. The plaintiff's objection was 
based upon the reasoning that contributory negligence is 
not a defense in such cases. This Circuit Court, however. 
sustained the trial court's ruling, admitting this evidence 
and said: 
"It is not sufficient to merely show a violation 
of the Safety Appliance Acts to support a recovery. 
That violation must be the proximate cause of the 
injury; and the contributing negligence of the in-
jured employee may be so great as to bar recovery." 
In Kern v. Payne, Dir. Gen., 6.5 Mont. 325, 211 P. 767, 
suit was brought by the administrator for the death of a 
railroad employee who was killed when he went between 
two cars to open knuckles of a defective coupler. In doing 
so he violated the safety rules of the company. The Supreme 
Court of Montana, in reversing a judgment for the adminis-
trator, said: 
"If it were assumed, in this case, that the de-
cedent knew of the defective knuckle, and knew that 
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the knuckle on the moving car was closed, we then 
have a situation where the deceased, knowing all of 
the circumstances, and with no necessity requiring 
him so to do, and with ample time and space in which 
to act, willfully and deliberately violates a rule of 
the company governing his conduct, and by his own 
carelessness and negligence brings about his own 
injury. 
"We recommend that the judgment and order 
be reversed, and the cause remanded to the district 
court of Custer county, with directions to dismiss 
the complaint." 
The Montana court quoted as authority for its position 
Thornton's Federal Employees' Liability Act and Safety 
Appliance Acts (3rd Ed.), page 469, wherein the author 
states: 
"In order to enable an employee to recover when 
he has been injured by a car not properly equipped 
with automatic couplers, such improper equipment 
or the absence of an automatic coupler must have 
been the proximate cause of his injury, and he has 
the burden to show that such was the fact." 
In Wilson v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., cited above, this 
Court held that "sole causation may include contributory 
negligence as the greater includes the lesser". In determin-
ing the sole cause of the plaintiff's injuries, his conduct 
and the surrounding circumstances of that conduct are 
proper subjects of inquiry. His understanding and apprec-
iation of the dangers involved in going between the cars 
are important in determining whether he acted negligently. 
His intentional and deliberate violation of the rules of the 
defendant designed to prevent accidents and the specific 
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instructions of the defendant preclude his recovery if they 
were the sole cause of the injury. The rejection by the 
court of this competent and material evidence deprived 
the defendant of a vital element of its defense. 
SUMMARY 
In conclusion, the defendant respectfully submits that 
no evidence was offered or received which tended to prove 
that the coupling mechanism on the cars involved failed 
in any particular to meet the full requirements of the stat-
ute; that, on the contrary, the coupling equipment demon-
strated by functioning perfectly on the occasion in which 
plaintiff was injured that it complied fully with the re-
quirements of the statute; that the trial court in its in-
structions committed prejudicial error consisting of an 
entirely unwarranted interpretation of the statute and in 
effect directing a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and 
in rejecting competent and material evidence which pre-
vented the defendant from having a fair trial; and that 
the judgment should be reversed with directions to the 
trial court to dismiss the action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
W. Q. VANCOTT, 
GRANT H. BAGLEY, 
S. N. CORNWALL, 
DENNIS McCARTHY, 
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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